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SCHOOL SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: NEWJERSEY v. T.L.O.
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has signifi-
cantly altered the traditional view of the fourth amendment to the
Constitution.1 New Jersey v. T.L.O.2 represents a further departure
from conventional analysis in the context of student searches by a
school official. The Supreme Court held that a school official's in-
school search of a student's purse, based on reasonable suspicion
that she had violated a school rule, was constitutional despite the
lack of a search warrant or probable cause. 3 Initially, this Note ex-
amines the fourth amendment precedent the Court faced when de-
ciding T.L.O.4 Second, it discusses the Court's decision.5 Third, it
argues that the Court misapplied precedent and reached an im-
proper result by creating a new and unnecessary approach to fourth
amendment jurisprudence.6 Finally, this Note suggests an analysis
that maintains the fourth amendment's inherent flexibility while en-
suring traditional fourth amendment rights for students.7
I
BACKGROUND
A. General Fourth Amendment Analysis
The framers of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution8 designed the amendment "to safeguard the privacy
and security of private individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernment officials" 9 by protecting reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. 10 It is enforceable against the states through the due process
1 See infra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
2 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
3 Id. at 343-48.
4 See infra notes 8-106 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 107-42 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 143-99 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
8 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
10 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places"). Prior to Katz, a search violated the fourth amendment
only by physical intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area." Berger v. New York,
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clause of the fourteenth amendment."I The framers intended that it
apply only to searches conducted by agents of the government1 2 and
not to acts by private individuals.' 3
The fourth amendment consists of two clauses. The "reason-
able clause" mandates that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in
their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."' 4 The "warrant clause" provides that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." 1 5 The rela-
tionship between these two clauses has generated much controversy
as to the amendment's proper construction.' 6 Commentators dis-
cern two theories in Supreme Court opinions: (1) the warrant
clause elucidates the reasonableness clause, and (2) each clause has
independent significance. 17 The first theory, known as the "conven-
tional" interpretation, holds that a search is unreasonable per se if
not conducted pursuant to a warrant, unless it comes under a
388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). Katz reflected the emerging view that the fourth amendment
protects personal expectations of privacy rather than specific physical locations. See gen-
erally Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV.
133 (asserting that Katz demonstrated the Court's willingness to "release the Fourth
Amendment... from the moorings of precedent and determine its scope by the logic of
its central concepts"). Thus, the Court held in Katz that electronic surveillance of a
public telephone booth, without a search warrant, violated the fourth amendment be-
cause even though the intrusion occurred in a public place, it violated the appellant's
expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
11 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
12 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) ("[amendment's] origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sover-
eign authority").
13 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (search by private
air freight carrier "did not violate Fourth Amendment because of its private character").
14 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
15 Id.
16 See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42-44, 266-67 (1966); Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in
Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 764; Weinreb, Generalities of
the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47-48 (1974).
17 E.g., Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
257, 281-82 (1984).
Professor Landynski argues that from a historical perspective there are actually
three possible interpretations: (1) a reasonable search is one that meets the warrant
requirements; (2) the reasonableness clause provides an additional restraint in that a
search may be unreasonable even when a warrant is secured; and (3) the reasonableness
clause provides an additional search power so that some warrantless searches neverthe-
less may be reasonable. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 16, at 42-43. He concludes that the
first two theories are plausible within the intended meaning of the amendment and pre-
fers the second interpretation to the first. He considers the third theory untenable be-
cause the fourth amendment makes no provision for warrantless searches. He reasons
that to detach the reasonableness clause from the warrant clause runs the risk of render-
ing the latter clause useless. Id. at 43-44.
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warrant clause exception.18 The second, called the "reasonable-
ness" theory, maintains that a warrantless search is constitutional if
it is reasonable. 19 Although the Supreme Court originally favored
the conventional interpretation, it has recently focused on the in-
dependent significance of the reasonableness clause in determining
the scope of legally permissible searches under the fourth amend-
ment. 20
1. The Conventional and Reasonableness Theories
Adherents of the conventional interpretation believe that the
warrant clause governs fourth amendment searches, relegating the
reasonableness clause to subordinate importance. 21 Under this the-
ory, the police22 must demonstrate to a magistrate that probable
cause exists in order to obtain a search warrant. 23 Probable cause
exists when the facts and circumstances within a person's knowl-
edge, plus any other reasonably trustworthy information, would
cause a person of reasonable caution to conclude that contraband
will be found in a particular place. 24 If the warrant clause incorpo-
rates the reasonableness clause, then "searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 25
18 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). For a discussion of the
warrant clause exceptions, see infra notes 25 & 41-67 and accompanying text.
19 See Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 321-22; infra notes 41-67 and accompanying
text.
20 Bacigal, supra note 16, at 764. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 309-40.
21 See, e.g., J. LANDYNSKX, supra note 16, at 42-44.
22 Fourth amendment protections are not limited to situations in which an individ-
ual is suspected of criminal behavior. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530; see infra text accompany-
ing note 123.
Camara involved an administrative search of a private premises to examine the
building's use and condition. For a general discussion of administrative inspections and
searches, see 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT 597-628 (2d ed. 1987).
23 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 554-55.
24 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Probable cause determinations are based upon the
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision... given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him"). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 22, at 540-610.
25 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted); accord United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 701 (1983); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are geared toward police safety: they include searches
incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); stop-and-frisk
searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); voluntary consent to search, Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); searches of areas in plain view, Harris v. United
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Therefore, under the conventional interpretation, a search not fall-
ing within an exception is reasonable only when probable cause ex-
ists to issue a warrant.
26
Adherents of the reasonableness theory believe that the fourth
amendment's two clauses operate independently. 27 Thus, a search
may be reasonable, and therefore constitutional, even if it is con-
ducted without a warrant.28 Analysis utilizing a reasonableness
standard may proceed in a number of ways. The most extreme al-
ternative, which is least protective of individual rights, applies a
commonsense (or "rational") analysis. 29 This standard is highly
amorphous because it has no guidelines but for the interpretation of
the term "reasonable." Furthermore, factors in determining rea-
sonableness change from case to case.30 The Court came closest to
adopting this "pure reasonableness" standard in United States v. Ra-
binowitz,3 ' stating, "What is a reasonable search is not to be deter-
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); and searches made in "hot pursuit" of perpetrators, War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Although a search warrant is not always required for a valid search, adherents of the
conventional view strongly prefer the warrant process because it "interposes an orderly
procedure under the aegis ofjudicial impartiality." United States v.Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
51 (1951). Even warrantless searches must be based upon probable cause-if they were
not, "a principal incentive now existing for the procurement of ... warrants would be
destroyed." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963) (similar analysis
applied in arrest warrant case). The difference between the probable cause require-
ments for warranted and warrantless searches is that "in a doubtful or marginal case a
search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall." United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965); see also 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22, at 548-
49.
26 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
27 See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 281; see also United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (inquiring whether search was reasonable rather than whether it
was reasonable to obtain warrant).
28 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("nothing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pursuant
to warrants").
29 Bacigal, supra note 16, at 765; see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433,
527 (1971) (referring to "commonsense standard of reasonableness governing search
and seizure cases") (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
30 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 510 ("test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se
rules; each case must be decided on its own facts") (Black, J., concurring and dissent-
ing); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 36 (1970) ("common sense dictates that reasonable-
ness varies with the circumstances of the search").
31 339 U.S. 56 (1950), rev'd, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). In
Rabinowitz, federal agents obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant, a dealer in
forged stamps. At the time of the arrest at the defendant's business address, the officers
searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets and found 573 forged stamps. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. at 57-59. The Supreme Court authorized the search as a valid search incident to an
arrest. Id. at 63-64.
In Chimel, police officers armed with an arrest warrant apprehended the petitioner in
his home. At the same time, the officers conducted a search of the entire house on the
basis of a lawful arrest. They seized items linking the defendant to several burglaries.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54. The Court held that the warrantless search could not be
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mined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what
are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we
have no ready litmus-paper test."32 Commentators severely criti-
cized Rabinowitz as the nadir of fourth amendment jurisprudence. 3
3
A less extreme version of the reasonableness standard weighs
in each case the state interest in conducting a search against the
magnitude of intrusion upon individual privacy. 34 These competing
interests are balanced on a sliding scale: as the intrusiveness of a
search increases, the state interest in carrying out the search also
must increase if it is to pass constitutional scrutiny. 35 While the
Supreme Court has never adopted the sliding scale approach explic-
itly,36 it has in some limited cases applied a balancing-of-interests
approach.
37
An even more restrictive form of the reasonableness standard
considers the warrant clause a touchstone for evaluating a search's
reasonableness. 38 This restrictive view employs a totality of circum-
stances test considering the existence of a warrant as but one rele-
vant factor. 39 However, if no warrant on probable cause exists,
adequate substitute safeguards must exist to compensate for non-
compliance with the warrant clause.
40
constitutionally justified as incident to an arrest. Id. at 768. The Chimel Court criticized
the Rabinowitz Court's characterization of fourth amendment requirements and rejected
the pure reasonableness view, stating that "[i]n the scheme of the [Fourth] Amendment,
... the [warrant clause] plays a crucial part." Id. at 761. The Court further noted that
any warrant clause exception must be strictly limited to the purpose underlying the ex-
ception. Thus, when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
only the arrestee and the immediately surrounding area to remove weapons and to pre-
vent concealment or destruction of evidence. Id. at 763. The searches in both Rabino-
witz and Chimel went beyond this narrow scope.
32 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63.
33 See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
394 (1974). Nevertheless, Rabinowitz's "ad hoc test of general reasonableness seems to
be precisely the interpretation of the amendment which the conservatives on the Court
now seek to restore." Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 312.
34 See Bacigal, supra note 16, at 764-65; Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 309-10.
35 Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 310.
36 Id. It cannot be said that the Court applies a true sliding scale analysis because
although the Court has required relatively low state interests to justify less intrusive
searches, it has not demanded higher than average interests where highly intrusive
searches are challenged. Id. at 310-12.
37 See infra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
38 Bacigal, supra note 16, at 765.
39 Gates, 462 U.S. at 229-31. Gates clearly implied that probable cause exists if based
upon reasonable evidence. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 329-40.
40 Bacigal, supra note 16, at 765. This view is more protective of individual rights
than the balancing-of-interests approach because it maintains a concern for adequate
protection of individual rights. Under the balancing-of-interests view, courts focus on
the importance of the governmental interest involved.
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2. The Supreme Court's Struggle in Construing the
Fourth Amendment
In developing the reasonableness approach, the Supreme Court
has applied a balancing-of-interests analysis to ease warrant clause
requirements in particular situations. The Court first balanced a
state's interest in conducting housing inspections against the pri-
vacy interests of the individual in a 1967 administrative search case,
Camara v. Municipal Court.4 1 The Camara appellant utilized the con-
ventional analysis in arguing that search warrants should be issued
only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a
particular dwelling contains violations of the applicable code's mini-
mum standards. 42 Rejecting the appellant's contention that a par-
ticularized probable cause determination is necessary, 43 the Court
held that an area search is reasonable where there is probable cause
to believe that violations exist within that geographic area 44 and
"where the need to search [outweighs] . . . the invasion which the
search entails." 45 Although the Court held that probable cause and
a warrant are needed to conduct an area inspection,46 its probable
cause determination was based upon legislative and administrative
standards, which vary with the municipal program being enforced.
47
Because Camara supports a variable probable cause standard, critics
have called it "a fundamental misreading of the Fourth Amend-
ment."48 In any event, Camara established a new variable probable
cause test and a balancing test to evaluate fourth amendment pro-
tections. 49 To date, the Supreme Court has extended the Camara
41 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967). Camara was charged with violating the San Fran-
cisco housing code for refusing to allow city housing inspectors to examine his ground-
floor apartment. The inspector, while conducting an annual inspection, sought to enter
Camara's premises after the building's manager told him that Camara was violating the
apartment building's occupancy permit. Alleging that the inspection ordinance was un-
constitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections, Camara sued for a writ of
prohibition. Id. at 525-26.
42 Id. at 534.
43 Id. The Court reasoned that requiring probable cause for each building search
would cripple housing code enforcement efforts. Id. at 536.
44 Id. at 537. Conventional analysis required probable cause to exist for each par-
ticular place searched. Id. at 534.
45 Id. at 537. The Court noted that the persuasive factors in the balance were the
long history ofjudicial and public acceptance of such inspections, the need to prevent
dangerous conditions, the absence of a practical alternative, and the minimal intrusion
of privacy by inspections, which were neither personal in nature nor aimed at discover-
ing evidence of crime. Id.
46 Id. at 538.
47 The Court stated that the factors in determining the existence of probable cause
would be "the passage of time, the nature of the building.... or the condition of the
entire area." Id.
48 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 607 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49 The Court, by explicitly rejecting appellant's contention that its new approach
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analysis to allow three types of searches where probable cause does
not exist: stop-and-frisk searches, 50 border searches, 5' and automo-
bile stops.
52
A year after Camara, the Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio
53
that the fourth amendment permits a police officer to engage in a
limited search for a criminal suspect's weapons in certain circum-
stances, even absent probable cause to arrest. 54 "[T]he Court
treated the stop-and-frisk as a sui generis 'rubric of police con-
duct,'"55 and concluded, "[T]here must be a narrowly drawn au-
thority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection
of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is deal-
ing with an armed and dangerous individual . ... 56 In reaching
this result, the Court balanced the government interest put forward
to justify the search against the intrusion upon the private citizen.57
Terry thus represented a significant change in the law: for the first
time, the Court used a balancing test to eliminate the probable
cause requirement.
58
The Supreme Court also has applied this reasonableness analy-
would reduce fourth amendment guarantees, acknowledged its break with conventional
analysis. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39.
50 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); see infra notes 53-58 and accompanying
text.
51 United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975); see infra notes 59-62
and accompanying text.
52 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); see infra notes 63-67 and accompa-
nying text.
53 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A police officer, while patrolling downtown Cleveland on his
regular shift, saw Terry and another man repeatedly stopping to stare in a store window
and then passing by. A third man later joined them. Sensing that the men were "cas-
ing" the store for a planned robbery, the officer confronted the men and asked for their
names. When they "mumbled something," the officer spun Terry's back to him, patted
down his outside clothing, and found a pistol in an overcoat pocket. Terry was charged
with carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 5-7.
54 Id. at 27. One commentator has suggested that even if an officer's authority to
stop and frisk a person does not require probable cause for an arrest, it may require
some other kind of probable cause. For example, the intrusion of a stop-and-frisk may
require probable cause to believe that the person was armed and dangerous. Annot., 32
L. Ed. 2d 942, 946 n.2 (1973).
55 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
56 Teny, 392 U.S. at 27; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) ("[A] law
enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a pat down to find
weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person
he has accosted.").
57 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Court balanced these interests based on Camara's au-
thority without distinguishing between administrative and criminal searches.
58 Because police officer safety was at stake, the Tery Court could have reached the
same result using conventional fourth amendment analysis by classifying the stop-and-
frisk under a previously established and well-delineated exception to the warrant re-
quirement. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Instead, its balancing test solidi-
fied Camara's reasonableness approach and pushed the Court further away from
conventional fourth amendment analysis.
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sis to allow searches designed to detect illegal immigration along
international borders upon less than probable cause. In United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce,59 the Court deemed constitutional the use of rov-
ing patrols to stop vehicles, usually for no more than a minute, to
check for illegal immigrants. 60 The Court noted that these intru-
sions did not encompass a search of the vehicle or its occupants, and
visual inspection was limited to peering through the vehicle's win-
dows. 61 Such searches are constitutional under the Camara rationale
because they are regulatory in nature, an important state interest
outweighs their intrusiveness, and no practical alternative to enforce
the state interest exists. The Court stated, "Because of the limited
nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort may be justified on facts
that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest."
62
The Camara analysis also has been extended to permit searches
during automobile stops on less than probable cause. In Delaware v.
Prouse,63 the Court held that an officer may not stop a vehicle unless
he has "at least [an] articulable and reasonable suspicion that a mo-
torist is unlicensed.., or that either the vehicle or an occupant is
otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law." 64 The Court
reached this result by balancing the public's interest in road safety
against the affected individuals' rights.65 Although the specific
search challenged in Prouse was not based upon any suspicion and
therefore was held unconstitutional, 66 the case is significant because
59 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
60 Although the Court prohibited random stops, it expressly permitted stops where
the facts "reasonably warrant suspicion." Id. at 884. This standard is more lenient than
probable cause.
61 Id. at 880.
62 Id.; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (random
stops based upon less than reasonable suspicion at border patrol checkpoints permitted
where level of intrusiveness is less than in Brignoni-Ponce).
The Brignoni-Ponce Court distinguished Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973), in which the Court held that a roving border patrol's thorough search for
aliens without a warrant or probable cause to believe the driver committed any crime
violated the fourth amendment. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874. Although the state in-
terest in Almeida-Sanchez was identical to the interest in Brignoni-Ponce, the Brignoni-Ponce
Court deemed the degree of intrusiveness too great to pass constitutional muster. Id. at
874-76.
63 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
64 Id. at 663. A police officer on patrol stopped Prouse's automobile. The officer
smelled marijuana smoke as he approached the vehicle and seized marijuana in plain
view on the car floor. Prouse was indicted for illegal possession of a controlled sub-
stance. Id. at 650.
65 Id. at 656-57.
66 At a hearing on Prouse's motion to suppress evidence, the officer testified that
prior to stopping the vehicle he observed no traffic or equipment violations and that he
made the stop merely to check the driver's license and registration. Id. at 650. The
Court found that random, discretionary spot checks of automobiles are more intrusive
than the border patrol stops in Martinez-Fuerte and at least as intrusive as the stops in
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it apparently articulates a balancing test in which probable cause
plays no part.
67
Whereas the Camara balancing test has been used in specific,
limited situations, the Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New York 68 re-
jected the general applicability of a multifactor balancing test that
would weigh the search's intrusiveness against the law enforcement
interest served in each case. 69 The Dunaway Court concluded that
"the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disap-
pear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circum-
stances presented by different cases." °70 The Court emphasized that
it has placed narrow limitations on the probable cause exceptions.
71
Some commentators have agreed that the Court should impose
strict limits on the use of a balancing test.
7 2
B. Treatment of School Searches Prior to T.L.O.
Until 1967, courts generally did not recognize that students73
possessed constitutional rights.74 The Supreme Court purported to
end this notion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Brignoni-Ponce. Id. at 656-57. Thus, the Prouse Court refused to validate such spot checks
because the state's privacy interest in promoting public safety on its roads did not out-
weigh individuals' privacy interests. Id. at 658-59.
67 The Court did not discuss the fourth amendment's probable cause standard.
68 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (detention and interrogation of suspect too intrusive with-
out probable cause).
69 Id. at 213-14.
70 Id. at 213.
71 Id. at 212.
72 See Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept. The Unreasona-
bleness of Being Reasonable, 58 B.U.L. REV. 436, 468 (1978) ("By wielding reasonableness
as a tool for validating searches and seizures undertaken without the sanction of prior
judicial approval, the Court quickly could reduce the warrant clause to mere surplus-
age."); Note, The Gradation of Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Context of Street Detentions:
People v. DeBour, 38 OHIO ST. LJ. 409, 436 (1977) ("[lIt is time for the judiciary to
reverse this process [of diverging from traditional fourth amendment principles] and to
return to the protection of fourth amendment rights through the use of objective
standards.").
73 This Note addresses only the constitutional rights of public elementary and sec-
ondary school students. There is no state action in private elementary and secondary
schools, therefore the fourteenth amendment does not apply. See supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text. Colleges and universities require a different analysis because the
vast majority of students are adults, and their education is no longer compulsory. See
infra note 127 and accompanying text. For discussions of searches in the university con-
text, see Bacigal, Warrantless Search of a College Dormitory, 7 AKRON L. REV. 422 (1974);
Note, The Legality of University-Conducted Dormitory Searches for Internal Disciplinary Purposes,
1976 DUKE LJ. 770; Comment, Public Universities and Due Process of Law: Students'Protection
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 512 (1969).
74 In the seminal juvenile rights case, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme
Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone." Id. at 13. The Court held that even juvenile delinquency proceedings must
provide for written notice of allegations, right to counsel, and the constitutional privi-
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District75 by stating that "[s]tudents [do not] ... shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."' 76 The Court argued that "[s]tudents in school as well as out
of school are 'persons' under [the] Constitution" 77 and therefore
deserve its full protection. Despite Tinker, courts have proven reluc-
tant to provide full fourth amendment protection to students.78
Only one state court has held that the fourth amendment fully ap-
plies to in-school searches. 79 The most common methods state
courts use to limit the fourth amendment's applicability to school
searches are (1) classification of the school official as a private actor,
and (2) reduction of the level of suspicion needed to conduct a
school search.
1. The School Official Classified as a Private Actor
Prior to T.L.0., some courts held that the fourth amendment
does not apply to school officials because these officials act in a pri-
vate capacity;8 0 thus, no state action exists to trigger the fourth
amendment.8' In so holding, many of these courts relied upon the
lege against self-incrimination. Id. at 30-57. The Court declared, "Due process of law is
the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom." Id. at 20.
The overlooking of students' constitutional rights may have derived partly from the
juvenile court system. Because juvenile court proceedings are private and only quasi-
criminal, they do not necessitate the full procedural and substantive law applied to
adults. See generally Note, Public School Searches and Seizures, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 202, 202-
03 (1976).
75 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
76 Id. at 506. The Tinker Court held that a high school regulation prohibiting the
wearing of black armbands violated students' first amendment rights because the school
failed to show how such activity would disrupt the educational process.
77 Id. at 511; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (remedial damages
available to student whose constitutional rights were violated); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975) (students possess procedural rights when facing school disciplinary action).
78 See infra notes 80-106 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding Tinker's mandate,
the Court has denied students the full protections of other amendments. See, e.g., Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment held inapplicable to school
disciplinary action).
79 State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated sub nom. Louisiana v. Mora, 423 U.S.
809 (1975) (case remanded to consider whether state court judgment was based on fed-
eral or state constitutional grounds, or both), modified, 330 So. 2d 900 (La.) (judgment
based on federal and state constitutional grounds), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). See
generally Note, Search and Seizure in the Public Schools, 36 LA. L. REV. 1067 (1975) (casenote
endorsing Mora). A few courts have held that the fourth amendment fully applies when
law enforcement officials are involved in the search. See M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F.
Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-21 (N.D. Ill.
1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S.E.2d 586, 594, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039
(1975).
80 See, e.g., In re Thomas G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1198-99, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364
(Ct. App. 1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (Ct.
App. 1969); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 384, 323 A.2d 145, 147
(1974); R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
81 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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in loco parentis doctrine, which postulates that a school official stands
in the student's parents' place and is therefore vested with the par-
ents' rights, duties, and responsibilities while the student is at
school.8 2 For example, in In re Donaldson,8 3 the California Court of
Appeals held that a public school official's search of a student's
locker constituted private action. The court reasoned that school
officials' in loco parentis status enabled them to employ moderate
force to obtain obedience in school. 84 The court noted that the
search's primary purpose was to further an educational objective by
securing evidence of student misconduct rather than to obtain evi-
dence of criminal wrongdoing. 85 Similarly, in Mercer v. State,8 6 a
Texas appellate court invoked the in loco parentis doctrine and found
that a public school official acted in a private capacity when con-
ducting a student search. The Mercer court, however, did not con-
sider the searcher's objective relevant in determining whether the
doctrine applied.
8 7
2. The Reduced Level of Suspicion Needed Reduced to Conduct
School Search
Before T.L. 0., courts applied the in loco parentis doctrine to jus-
tify searches based upon reasonable suspicion88 that a student was
violating or had violated a school rule or a criminal prohibition.8 9
82 S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM § 3.7(b), at 3-23
(1980); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
83 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1969).
84 Id. at 513, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
85 Id. at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
86 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Acting on a tip, the school principal
directed the appellant to empty his pockets. The search revealed marijuana and drug
paraphernalia. Id. at 716.
87 Id. at 717.
One court rejected the in loco parentis doctrine but found the fourth amendment
inapplicable to student searches. In D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982), the court found that although in loco parentis is an outmoded doctrine, id. at 255,
the fourth amendment only applies to criminal or area-wide exploratory investigations
conducted by specialized law enforcement officers. Id. at 260.
88 The term "reasonable suspicion" derives from Justice Douglas's description of
the majority's standard in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has never clearly defined "reasonable suspicion". It has been de-
scribed as an objective standard, id. at 21-22, requiring "articulable" facts indicating that
a crime has occurred. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (where au-
thorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting reasonable belief that traveler's
luggage contains narcotics, brief seizure for further investigation is constitutional).
89 See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (upholding search
of high school student's coat for hashish); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (upholding search and seizure of drug paraphernalia in open view in
student's car); Ex rel. J.A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980) (upholding search
of high school student's coat for marijuana); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313
N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. 1970) (upholding search of high school student for narcotics);
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In People v. Jackson,90 a New York court found that a school "Coordi-
nator of Discipline" was a government agent,91 but upheld a student
search for narcotics conducted several blocks away from the school
based upon reasonable suspicion.92 Applying the in loco parentis doc-
trine, the court concluded that school officials have an affirmative
obligation to protect students under their care from "harmful and
dangerous influences."193 The court reasoned that an understanding
of the distinct relationship between school officials and students was
required in determining the reasonableness of a school official's ac-
tions.94 The court went so far as to state that "[t]he in loco parentis
doctrine is so compelling in light of public necessity and as a social
concept . . . , that any action, including a search, taken ... upon
reasonable suspicion should be accepted as necessary and reason-
able." 95 Furthermore, by finding that the in loco parentis policy does
not end abruptly at the school door,9 6 the court permitted the
school official greater freedom to conduct an off premises search
than it would permit a law enforcement official.
97
Other courts not applying the in loco parentis doctrine neverthe-
less have held that a school official may conduct an in-school search
upon less than probable cause.98 In Tarter v. Raybuck, 99 the Sixth
Circuit held that a search of a student's person did not violate the
fourth amendment because the official had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the search was necessary either to maintain school discipline
In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1979) (upholding search of stu-
dent's pocket for dangerous or illegal items).
90 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. Term 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284
N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
91 Id. at 911, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
92 Id. at 914, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736. The Coordinator of Discipline noticed a bulge
in the student's left pants pocket on the school premises. He requested that the student
accompany him to his office and the student agreed, but en route the student fled the
school grounds. The Coordinator gave chase, catching him three blocks from the
school. He grabbed the student's clenched left hand and wrested away from the stu-
dent's fist a syringe, an eyedropper, and other drug paraphernalia. Id. at 909-10, 319
N.Y.S.2d at 732-33.
93 Id. at 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33.
94 Id. at 912, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
95 Id. at 915, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 737. A Delaware appellate court, in State v. Baccino,
282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), followedJackson by adopting a reasonable suspi-
cion standard based on the existence of the student/teacher relationship. Id. at 871-72.
96 Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d at 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
97 Id at 915, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 737 (Markowitz, J., dissenting).
98 See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (no reasonable suspi-
cionjustifying strip search of whole fifth grade class); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46,
233 N.W.2d 180 (1975) (upholding search of high school student for LSD); Doe v. State,
88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (Ct. App.) (upholding search ofjunior high school student
for marijuana), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975).
99 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
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and order or to maintain an environment conducive to education.100
The court noted that not only must the official have a reasonable
ground for instituting the search,101 but also the search itself must
be reasonable. 10 2 The Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Young'
03
adopted a standard more lenient than reasonable suspicion for
school searches. Although the court found that the school official
was a government agent, t0 4 it concluded that a school official may
constitutionally search a student in the "good faith" exercise of his
duties. 10 5 The court allowed the search merely because the student
acted "suspiciously." 1
0 6
The Supreme Court thus heard New Jersey v. T.L.O against a
backdrop of case law that placed school searches outside of the
fourth amendment's general warrant and probable cause require-
ments. Most of these decisions held either that the fourth amend-
ment did not apply to school officials or that school officials could
search upon reasonable suspicion.
II
NEwJERsEY v. T.L. 0.
A. The Facts
On March 7, 1980, a Piscataway High School teacher discov-
ered T.L.O. 10 7 and a second girl smoking in a lavatory.'0 8 Because
smoking on campus violated a school rule, 10 9 the teacher took the
two students to see assistant vice principal Theodore Choplick."10
When T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking, Choplick de-
100 Id. at 982. The court rejected application of the in locoparentis doctrine by stating
that school officials are employed and paid by the state and are therefore state agents.
Id. at 981 n.4.
101 The court determined that a reasonable ground existed where the defendant
principal personally observed activity that he reasonably believed indicated use and sale
of marijuana. Id. at 983.
102 Id. at 982. The court opined that a body cavity search of a youth for contraband
(possession of which would violate a school rule) would not be justified. Under such
circumstances, the individual's privacy interest dearly would outweigh any interest in
school discipline. Id. at 982-83.
103 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975).
104 Id. at 494, 216 S.E.2d at 591.
105 Id. at 496, 216 S.E.2d at 592-93.
106 Id. at 498, 216 S.E.2d at 593 (student exhibited furtive gestures and conscious-
ness of guilt when assistant principal approached).
107 Initials are commonly used to identify a minor who is a party to a lawsuit. The
appellee's full name was Terry Lee Owens. She was 14 years old at the time. Stewart,
And in Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 1985 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (Feb. 1985).
108 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
109 Smoking on school grounds violated a school handbook rule. PARENT-STUDENT
HANDBOOK OF PISCATAWAY (N.J.) HIGH SCHOOL (1979), Record Doc. S-1, at 7; see also
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 377 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 T.L.O..469U.S.at328.
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manded to see her purse and upon opening it discovered a pack of
cigarettes."' As he removed the cigarettes from the purse he spot-
ted a package of cigarette rolling papers. 1 2 He continued searching
the purse and discovered a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, and
miscellaneous paraphernalia' 3 that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana
dealing. Choplick delivered this evidence to the police, who insti-
tuted delinquency charges against T.L.O."
4
T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence at her delinquency
hearing, arguing that the search violated the fourth amendment." 5
The juvenile court, concluding that the search was reasonable, de-
nied the motion to suppress, 1 6 found T.L.O. delinquent, and sen-
tenced her to probation for one year." ' 7 T.L.O. appealed to the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, where a di-
vided court affirmed the finding that the search did not violate the
fourth amendment." 8 The NewJersey Supreme Court reversed," 9
and the United States Supreme Court subsequently granted New
Jersey's petition for a writ of certiorari.' 20
11 Id.
112 Id. Choplick would not have seen the cigarette rolling papers if he had not re-
moved the cigarettes. Id.
113 Id. Choplick also found a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of
money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed
money to T.L.O., and two letters implicating T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 329.
116 State ix rel. T.L.O., 178 NJ. Super. 329, 343, 428 A.2d 1327, 1334 (Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1980). The court held that the evidence met a reasonable suspicion standard.
The court reasoned that when the teacher observed T.L.O. smoking, the school official
had a duty to investigate and thus was justified in opening the purse. While an explora-
tory search was not permissible at that point, the opening of the purse brought the
search within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. See supra note 25.
Choplick's sighting of the marijuana and other paraphernalia justified a complete search
of the purse. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 NJ. Super. at 343, 428 A.2d at 1334.
117 TL.O., 469 U.S. at 330.
118 State ix reL T.L.O., 185 NJ. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982) (per curiam). The court vacated, however, the finding of delinquency and re-
manded for a determination of whether T.L.O. had knowingly waived her fifth amend-
ment rights before confessing.
119 State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 NJ. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983). Like the trial court, the
New Jersey Supreme Court applied a reasonable suspicion test, stating that "when a
school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of
illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order, the
school official has the right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence." Id. at
346, 463 A.2d at 941-42. The court held, however, that the assistant principal did not
have the requisite suspicion to search. The court noted that mere possession of ciga-
rettes did not violate a school rule because smoking was allowed in designated areas.
The purse's contents, therefore, had no direct bearing on the infraction. Furthermore,
he had no reasonable grounds to believe that the purse contained cigarettes. Id. at 347,
463 A.2d at 942.
120 464 U.S. 991 (1983). The petition for certiorari raised only the issue of
"whether the exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delin-
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B. The Supreme Court Opinion
A divided Supreme Court 12 1 held that the search of T.L.O. did
not violate the fourth amendment. The Court decided two impor-
tant issues affecting student searches: (1) whether the fourth amend-
ment applies to school officials, and (2) if so, what degree of
suspicion a school official needs before he may conduct a lawful
search.
1. The Fourth Amendment Applies to School Officials
The Court first determined that the fourth amendment applies
to searches conducted by public school officials. The Court rea-
soned that the fourth amendment applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment and that public school officials are state ac-
tors under the fourteenth amendment. 122 It rejected New Jersey's
contention that the fourth amendment only applies to law enforce-
ment officers, noting that the amendment has long been applied to
the activities of both civil and criminal authorities because "it would
be 'anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual
is suspected of criminal behavior.' "123
The Court also rejected the argument that the in loco parentis
quency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official without the in-
volvement of law enforcement officers." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331. The Court
nevertheless ordered reargument on the search's legality. Justice Stevens, in dissent,
criticized the Court for unnecessarily and inappropriately reaching a constitutional ques-
tion. Id. at 371 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that
the Court instead should have affirmed the state court's judgment suppressing the evi-
dence. Id. at 372 (Stevens,J., concurring and dissenting). Although certiorari was origi-
nally granted to determine the exclusionary rule's applicability, the Court refused to
reach this issue. See id. at 333 n.3 ("[O]ur determination that the search at issue in this
case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of the ques-
tion of the applicability of the exclusionary rule."). Professor Yale Kamisar speculates
that the Supreme Court may have requested reargument because there were fewer than
five members of the Court who would have voted not to apply the exclusionary rule to
school searches. Stewart, supra note 107, at 54. By ordering reargument and determin-
ing that no fourth amendment violation existed, the Court did not have to reach the
exclusionary rule issue.
121 Justice White wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Powell,
Rehnquist, and ChiefJustice Burger joined. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion,
which Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun also wrote an opinion concurring in
the judgment. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurred in part
and dissented in part. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Marshall joined, and with
whom Justice Brennan joined in part, concurred in part and dissented in part.
122 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333-37; see also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. All
nine Justices agreed that school officials are subject to the fourth amendment. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 353-54 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 371 (Stevens, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
123 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530
(1966)).
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doctrine excludes school officials from the dictates of the fourth
amendment. 124 The Court noted that school authorities are consid-
ered state actors under the first' 25 and fourteenth 126 amendments.
Moreover, the Court observed that the concept of parental delega-
tion is not consonant with compulsory education laws. 127
2. Reasonable Suspicion is Needed for a Lawful School Search
The Court next address the degree of suspicion necessary to
validate a school search. 128 The Court concluded that the fourth
amendment mandates a balancing of the state's need to search
against the search's invasion of personal liberty to determine the
"standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of
searches."' 29 On one side of the balance is society's substantial in-
terest in maintaining discipline in the school environment.' 30 The
Court noted that drug use and violent crime within the schools had
become major social problems in recent years13 1 and that the pres-
124 Id. at 336. The status of state court decisions curbing students' fourth amend-
ment rights based upon in loco parentis is therefore questionable. See supra notes 82-97
and accompanying text.
125 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336; see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (public school officials subject to first amendment).
126 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process
clause applicable to public school officials).
127 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. The Court considered school officials agents of the gov-
ernment who further compulsory education laws, not mere parental surrogates. Id.; see,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1968) (requiring every parent having custody of
child between ages of six and 16 to enroll child in public school or equivalent).
128 Justice Brennan would have ceased the inquiry upon finding that the fourth
amendment applies to school officials and that the search was full-scale. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 337. Thus, the Court apparently rejected the conventional analysis and
adopted the balancing-of-interests approach to the standard of reasonableness gov-
erning school searches.
Justice Blackmun, although concurring in the judgment, noted that the Supreme
Court uses a balancing test only when confronted with a special law enforcement need
for flexibility. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He believed, however, that the
school setting presents such a special need for flexibility. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
Justice Brennan vigorously opposed generalized use of a balancing test and advo-
cated three principles for fourth amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 354-55 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). First, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject
only to a few exceptions. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Second, full-scale
searches are reasonable only on a showing of probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the evidence will be found in the place to be searched. T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 355 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). Third,
searches that are substantially less intrusive than full-scale searches may be justifiable in
accordance with a balancing test. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 355 (citing Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
130 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
131 Id. (citing I NATIONAL INST. OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WEL-
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ervation of an orderly educational environment requires close su-
pervision of students. Furthermore, the Court recognized that
maintaining school order and security depends upon informal and
flexible school disciplinary procedures.' 32 On the other side of the
balance is the student's privacy interest. Noting that students may
bring to school a number of legitimate, noncontraband items, the
Court found that students have legitimate expectations of
privacy. 133
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the ordinary restric-
tions on government searches must be eased in the school set-
ting.' 34 The Court reasoned that the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement is unsuited to the school environment because it would
interfere with the prompt and informal disciplinary procedures de-
sirable in schools. 135 Furthermore, the TL.O. Court opined that
strict adherence to the probable cause requirement is not necessary,
stating, "The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is
that searches and seizures be reasonable ... ."136 The Court con-
FARE, VIOLENT SCHOOLS, SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS (1978)).
132 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40.
133 Id. at 338-39. The Court acknowledged that the fourth amendment does not
protect unreasonable, subjective privacy expectations but refused to equate students
with prisoners who retain no legitimate expectations of privacy. Id.
Justice Powell concluded that students do not have the same constitutional protec-
tions as adults because students within the school environment have a lesser expectation
of privacy than do members of the population in general. Id. at 348 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
134 Id. at 340. Justice Blackmun viewed education as government's most important
function and stressed the state's obligation to safeguard students within its care. Id. at
353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He noted that school officials have no experience with
probable cause and are ill-equipped to make quick probable causejudgments. He con-
cluded that the dynamics of the school setting demand prompt action and that a warrant
requirement would defeat timely intervention. Id.
135 Id. at 340. All nine Justices agreed that teachers may search a student's belong-
ings without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 355-56. Justice Brennan argued, however,
that the Court should not use a balancing test to justify this exception: only a special
government interest, beyond the general interest in apprehending lawbreakers, can jus-
tify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). This special interest exists in the school setting because a teacher
can neither perform his educational functions nor adequately protect students' safety if
required to wait for a warrant. Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens opined that warrantless searches of students by school administrators are
reasonable when undertaken to maintain order in the school. Id. at 376 (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
136 Id. at 340. Justice Brennan argued that the majority's elimination of probable
cause as a requirement for a full-scale search violated both precedent and policy. He
stated that every previous Supreme Court case had held that probable cause is a prereq-
uisite for a full-scale search, id. at 358 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); the line
of cases begun by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), only utilizes a balancing test to
evaluate minimally intrusive searches involving crucial law enforcement interests.
T.L. 0., 469 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Even assuming argu-
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cluded that the legality of a student search depends on its reasona-
bleness under all the circumstances; 3 7 thus, the constitutionality of
a school search turns on 'whether the ... action was justified at its
inception' [and] whether the search . . . 'was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference' "138 with
the student's privacy.
The Court applied this test to conclude that the search of
T.L.O. was constitutional. 139 The Court found that Choplick's ini-
tial search for cigarettes in T.L.O.'s purse was justified because pos-
session of cigarettes related to the accusation of smoking:140 his
"common-sense" conclusion that she might possess cigarettes justi-
fied his search of T.L.O.'s purse.' 4 ' The Court further found that
the discovery of rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana, thus justifying the further





Constitutional analysis of any search should begin with an as-
sumption of full fourth amendment protection. The strict require-
ments of the warrant clause and of probable cause should always
apply, subject only to specifically established, narrow exceptions.
By deciding that the fourth amendment's underlying command is
that searches be reasonable, the Court erected a framework under
which an ever-increasing number of searches may be deemed consti-
endo that using a balancing test was the correct analysis, Justice Brennan objected to the
test's application. He maintained that the majority vastly overstated the social costs of
the probable cause standard and failed to accord sufficient weight to the defendant's
privacy interests. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
137 Id. at 341. Justice Stevens criticized the majority's treating school rules as if they
were "fungible," thereby allowing searches to uncover evidence of "even the most triv-
ial" violations of school regulations. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Stevens suggested that only situations that seriously disrupt school order or the
education process constitute reasonable grounds for a search. Id. at 378 (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
138 Id. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
139 Id. at 343.
140 Id. at 344. Evidence that is otherwise relevant to an inquiry need not be conclu-
sive as to the ultimate fact in issue; thus, possession of cigarettes provides the nexus
between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. Id.
141 Id. at 346 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
142 Id. at 347. Applying the probable cause standard to the facts, Justice Brennan
concluded that the search violated T.L.O.'s fourth amendment rights. Upon opening
the purse and discovering the cigarettes, Choplick's search was complete. Id. at 368
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Choplick did not have probable cause to con-
tinue the search; his suspicion of the presence of marijuana was based solely on his
illegal discovery of rolling papers. Id.
385
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tutionally permissible. Thus, the TL.O. Court stripped the fourth
amendment of much of its effectiveness.
A. The Impropriety of T.L.O.'s Reasonableness Approach
Under conventional fourth amendment analysis, all state-spon-
sored searches must be conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained
upon a showing of probable cause.' 43 Where this standard has
proved impracticable, the Court has carved out specific exceptions
to the warrant clause requirements. 144 The T.L.O. Court impru-
dently and unnecessarily abandoned this measured approach by an-
alyzing the challenged search under a broad reasonableness
standard.
T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard does not provide a workable
general framework for fourth amendment analysis; in most situa-
tions application of the reasonableness view is both illogical and un-
wieldy. Even though the reasonableness view may be textually
plausible, "[i]t would be strange . .. for the amendment to specify
stringent warrant requirements, after having in effect negated these
by authorizing judicially unsupervised 'reasonable' searches without
warrant. To detach the first clause from the second is to run the risk
of making the second virtually useless."' 45 Furthermore, "reasona-
bleness" is a notoriously difficult standard to apply to searches and
seizures. As one commentator noted,
[T]he word "reasonable" takes on two distinct meanings in fourth
amendment analysis. Students of the fourth amendment quickly
learn that for courts and commentators "reasonableness" is both
a term of art synonymous with constitutionality and a convenient
shorthand denoting a process of rational analysis. Failure to dis-
tinguish reasonableness as a process of rational thought from
"reasonableness" as a standard of constitutionally permissible be-
havior, however, is fatal to any attempt to delimit the scope of
fourth amendment protection .... Unfortunately, an analysis of
relevant Supreme Court cases reveals that the Court has failed to
establish an objective methodology which would facilitate the
identification of constitutionally permissible searches from among
those considered reasonable in behavioral terms.' 46
Furthermore, the Court's "implication that the balancing test is the
rule rather than the exception"' 47 is both substantively inaccurate
and intellectually dishonest. 48 As Justice Brennan noted in his
143 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
145 J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 16, at 44.
146 Bacigal, supra note 16, at 763.
147 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148 If the Supreme Court has adopted the reasonableness view of the fourth amend-
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dissent, the balancing test is flawed at both its inception and
execution. 149
1. The Court's Reasonableness Approach Contradicts the Fourth
Amendment's Purpose
By needlessly balancing away the probable cause requirement,
the T.L.0. Court effectively rewrote the fourth amendment to
render the warrant clause inapplicable. "Probable cause" is not a
judicially developed doctrine that a court may balance away when it
finds that constraints on government action no longer appear desir-
able. When the framers formulated the fourth amendment, they de-
liberately chose the probable cause standard as the proper balance
between governmental and private interests.1 50
The warrant clause's probable cause requirement guards
against indiscriminate searches and seizures in three ways. First, it
prevents unjustified searches and seizures by securing an individual's
right to privacy until adequate justification is demonstrated for in-
terfering with that privacy.' 5 ' Second, it protects against arbitrary
searches and seizures by preventing capricious exercises of power
by government officials. 152 Finally, it requires a high level of suspi-
cion to justify a search, thereby decreasing the incidence of mis-
take:' 53 because reasonable suspicion requires less certainty than
probable cause, it will allow more searches of innocent people.
The fourth amendment was adopted specifically to protect
against searches conducted upon a lesser standard of suspicion than
probable cause. Cases both before and immediately after the
amendment's adoption rejected "common rumor or report, suspi-
ment to analyze searches and seizures, it should uniformly apply a balancing test. It
seems, however, that the Court employs conventional analysis whenever the facts of the
case meet the probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S.
727, 733-34 (1984) (per curiam) (officer's affidavit supported magistrate's finding of
probable cause and issuance of warrant); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (same).
149 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
150 In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), Justice Blackmun observed:
While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unrea-
sonable seizures, the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of
most [searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers: the
Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided
that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by judicial warrant based
on probable cause.
Id. at 722 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214
(1979) ("For all but ... narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing' has been
performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that [searches and]
seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause.").
151 Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 411; see also Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 308-09.
152 Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 411.
153 Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 933, 948 (1985).
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cion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' "154 as inadequate to justify
a lawful search.
Despite the weight of authority, the T. L. 0. Court applied a rea-
sonableness standard where it was unnecessary to do so.' 55 The
Court justified its choice of a reasonable suspicion standard by argu-
ing that lay persons (such as school officials) would not be able to
make accurate probable cause determinations. 156 Such reasoning is
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, probable cause is at least as
easy a standard to apply as reasonable suspicion. The Court has
stated repeatedly that the probable cause concept is based upon
common sense and is nontechnical. 157 In contrast, the reasonable
suspicion standard leaves great potential for abuse 58 and is likely to
promote undue judicial deference in evaluating challenged
searches. 159 The Court recently recognized that "[t]he test of rea-
sonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In each case, it requires a bal-
ancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of
the personal rights that the search entails."' 160
Second, even assuming arguendo that probable cause is a diffi-
cult concept, the state could either educate teachers about probable
cause or assign law enforcement officials to conduct school searches.
The Court's implication that the efficacy of constitutional rights var-
ies depending on the ease and expense of government compliance is
unwarranted. As the Court has stated, "the fact that a given law or
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating func-
tions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government .... -161
2. The Reasonableness Approach was Inappropriate
The T.L.O. Court made no attempt to review general rules of
154 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).
155 See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
156 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
157 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 742 (1983).
158 Note, School Officials May Conduct Student Searches Upon Satisfaction of Reasonableness
Test in Order to Maintain Educational Environment, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 738, 753 (1984);
see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
159 Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 394 ("If there are no fairly clear rules telling the
policemen what he may and may not do, courts are seldom going to say that what he did
was unreasonable.").
160 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (applying reasonableness standard to
strip searches of prison inmates).
161 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (one house veto violates separation of
powers).
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fourth amendment jurisprudence; it merely cited Camara v. Munici-
pal Court'62 for the proposition that determining the reasonableness
of a search requires a balancing of the need to search against the
search's privacy invasion. The Court then applied the balancing test
and concluded that relaxation of the probable cause requirement
for school searches was appropriate.
163
The majority's reliance on Camara is misplaced, however, be-
cause Camara involved a unique kind of search. The Camara Court
used a balancing test only in light of its determination that it could
not adequately protect the particular governmental interests in-
volved if it required individualized suspicion. 164 In contrast,
Choplick accused T.L.O. of generally violating a rule-New Jersey
was not trying to prevent an infraction by a group of students. Fur-
thermore, the T.L.O. Court's approach ignored Camara's explicit
statement that .'probable cause' is the standard by which a particu-
lar decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of
reasonableness."' 165 Under Camara, a court should apply the balanc-
ing process to determine what quantum of evidence satisfies the
probable cause requirement, not to determine if probable cause is
the correct standard to use, as the T.L.O. Court did. The Camara
Court recognized that reasonableness encompasses probable cause
when it stated, "In determining whether a particular inspection is
reasonable-and thus in determining whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for the in-
spection must be weighed in terms of... reasonable goals of code
enforcement." 166
Other decisions prior to T.L. 0. that employed a reasonableness
analysis rather than a conventional analysis are consistent with
Camara; in each case a law enforcement objective beyond gathering
evidence of criminal conduct existed, and it would have been im-
practicable to require a warrant and probable cause. A stop-and-
frisk 167 scenario permits no time to obtain a warrant; requiring that
a police officer show probable cause before disarming a suspect may
endanger the officer's life. Border patrols 168 deter illegal immigra-
tion by threatening random detection, as in Camara. This purpose
could not be achieved if probable cause and a warrant were required
for every car searched. The same analysis applies to automobile
162 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967); see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
163 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
164 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38.
165 Id. at 534.
166 Id. at 535.
167 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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stops, 169 which similarly attempt to induce compliance with safety
laws.
A reasonableness analysis is therefore appropriate where the
only effective search must be warrantless and not based on probable
cause. In a student search, the school still can achieve its goal of
enforcing rules within the confines of the probable cause
requirement. 1
70
3. Even if Appropriate, the Court Misapplied the
Reasonableness Approach
Even if a "reasonableness" balancing process is proper in the
school context, the T.L.O. Court skewed the balance in favor of the
state. On the side of the balance designated as the state's interest,
the Court weighed the state's need for efficient law enforcement
rather than the costs of requiring probable cause. 17 1 In addition to
characterizing the societal/governmental interest solely as the
school official's obligation to maintain order, the Court should have
considered the negative effects of denying students full fourth
amendment protection. 172 For example, the denial of students' pri-
vacy expectations could create resentment toward school officials
and disrupt student-teacher relations-precisely the relations that
the Court sought to foster.'
73
In addition, the vast majority of schools do not have the drug
and violence problems cited by the majority. 174 In any case, the
presence of such problems alone cannot justify abandoning the
169 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
170 It is impracticable to require warrants in a school setting. Students accused of
infractions could simply hide items that violate school rules after being accused of pos-
sessing them. The idea of obtaining a warrant to search for minor items like squirt guns
or gum is ludicrous. Indeed, all nine T.L.O. Justices agreed that warrants are inappro-
priate for student searches. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 355-56; see supra note 135.
The Court demonstrated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40
(1967), that the warrant question should be separate from the probable cause standard
question. Prior to T.L.O., Professor LaFave noted, however, that subsequent cases had
not heeded the teachings of Camara and failed to distinguish between the warrant and
probable cause questions. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 469.
171 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The Court
characterized the state's side of the balance as "the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order." Id. at 337. However, the state must
also protect the privacy and security of its private citizens. Therefore, the Court should
not have balanced the rights of the state against the rights of private citizens, but rather
it should have balanced the different constitutional methods of carrying out the state's
varied responsibilities against each other. Id. at 363 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
172 Note, supra note 158, at 752.
173 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 ("[W]e have respected the value of preserving the infor-
mality of the student-teacher relationship.").
174 Hogan & Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools, 7 WHITTIER L.
REv. 527, 547 (1985).
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usual fourth amendment safeguards.1 75 The Court assumed that
school officials would be unable to fulfill their educational mission if
they were subject to the same fourth amendment requirements as
law enforcement officials. 176 This assumption is unsupported and
probably incorrect; school officials could likely maintain school dis-
cipline despite the probable cause requirement.
177
In weighing the competing interests of individual and state, the
T.L.O. Court should have focused on the infringement of the indi-
vidual's privacy right, not on the government's need to search.
Although the Court acknowledged that students have perfectly
sound reasons for carrying purses containing "highly personal
items"' 178 and that "[a] search of... a closed purse... is undoubt-
edly a severe violation of [legitimate] subjective expectations of pri-
vacy," 179 it failed to accord these factors enough weight in its
analysis. 180 The fourth amendment was designed to protect persons
from excessive and unjustified governmental intrusions. With the
obvious exception of a strip search, it is difficult to envision a more
intrusive violation of privacy than the search of a purse. Indeed, the
Court has stated, "[L]uggage is a common repository for one's per-
sonal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expecta-
tion of privacy."' 181 A purse often contains items of an even more
personal nature than luggage.'
8 2
Prior to T.L.O., the Supreme Court emphasized the limited
scope of the search in all cases utilizing a balancing test to allow
limited searches upon less than probable cause. 183 The Terry Court,
in describing the stop-and-frisk in question, noted that the police
officer "confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary
to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he
discovered the weapons."' 184 Similarly, in the border patrol cases
175 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 167 (focus should be on maintenance of proper
educational environment).
176 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
177 See supra text accompanying note 170.
178 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
179 Id. at 337-38.
180 While the Court did not explicitly call the search of T.L.O. "full-scale," asJustice
Brennan did, see supra note 104, the Court's conclusion that the search severely violated
T.L.O.'s privacy, see supra note 179 and accompanying text, seems the equivalent of a
full-scale search.
181 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979) (luggage is subject to warrant
requirement).
182 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
183 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) ("When the nature and
extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less
than probable cause.").
184 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). While the Terry Court itself noted that a
frisk "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great in-
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the Court focused great concern on the scope of the search.
Whereas in Alameida-Sanchez v. United States, 185 the Court held that a
thorough search for aliens violated the fourth amendment, the
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce'8 6 Court allowed a brief stop and ques-
tioning "[b]ecause of the limited nature of the intrusion."' 187 The
T.L. 0. Court, on the other hand, would apply the reasonable suspi-
cion test to any search in the school context, whether limited or
not, 188 requiring merely that the scope be "reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and nature of the infraction."1 89
4. Contradictions Within the Court's Analytical Framework
Although the Court recognized students' privacy rights, 190 its
approach may ultimately destroy those rights. Searches based on
reasonable suspicion of the violation of the most trivial school rules
may now pass constitutional muster. t 91 For example, a school offi-
cial may conduct a full-scale search to enforce school rules regulat-
ing such innocuous activities as gum chewing or attire192 so long as
a court later deems the search reasonable under the circum-
stances. 193 The Court at least should have limited its holding to
school rules disciplining conduct highly disruptive of the educa-
tional process. While all school rules arguably are created to pro-
mote order, many rules only indirectly serve this purpose.
194
Certainly there should be some point, even under a balancing test,
dignity and arouse strong resentment," id. at 17, numerous later courts have character-
ized a Tery-stop as limited and minimally intrusive. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 705 (1983) ("substantially less intrusive of a person's liberty interests than a formal
arrest"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) ("less intrusive seizure"); Del-
aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) ("stop is limited and resulting detention quite
brief"); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) ("brief detention").
185 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
186 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
187 Id. at 880; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)
(random stops at border patrol checkpoints allowed upon less than reasonable suspicion
because of minimal intrusiveness); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-59 (1979)
(random automobile stops unconstitutional because level of intrusion on individuals
outweighs state interest). But see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985) (detention of traveler at border to await bowel movement to check for alimentary
canal smuggling of narcotics permitted where based on reasonable suspicion).
188 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
189 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
190 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
191 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 377 (StevensJ, concurring and dissenting).
192 Id. at 377 n.16 (StevensJ, concurring and dissenting).
193 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
194 For example, a school board may create a rule prohibiting gum chewing in class.
This rule indirectly enforces school order in the sense that a student may chew gum to
defy a teacher's authority. However, reasonable suspicion of mere possession of gum
clearly should not authorize a full-scale search for gum.
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where the state's need to enforce a rule is so minor that a search
cannot be justified. 195
The TL.0. analysis is particularly ill-advised because although
society wants students to respect the law, the Court has decreed that
their very status as students affords them less constitutional protec-
tion than other citizens enjoy. 196 Students generally enjoy full
fourth amendment rights away from school premises. Once in
school, however, T.L.O. subjects students to full-scale searches by
school officials under a reasonable suspicion standard. This clearly
violates the Tinker maxim that students do not shed their rights at
the schoolhouse gate. 197
The Court deliberately chose not to discuss the applicability of
the exclusionary rule,198 yet, T.L.0. empowers school officials to
conduct searches that undermine the values used to justify the ex-
ception in the first place. The T.L.O. analysis deems student
searches upon reasonable suspicion constitutional because of fac-
tors unique to the educational setting. Thus, the state should use
the fruits of a search only to effectuate valid school goals and to
benefit the student's welfare.
Possession of an item that violates a school rule justifies a
school-imposed punishment to foster respect for school rules. The
school should notify the student's parents of all contraband seized
in order to reduce the likelihood of future transgressions. Such evi-
dence also justifies compelling the student to attend counselling or
educational programs. For example, the school could have required
T.L.O. to attend classes discussing the health risks resulting from
smoking. Such use of the school search exception serves valid edu-
cational aims. In contrast, when a student search is used for non-
school purposes, that search's fruits should be subjected once more
to conventional fourth amendment analysis. Just as any illegally ob-
tained evidence must be destroyed rather than used for criminal
prosecution,' 99 any evidence seized through a student search should
be excluded from subsequent criminal proceedings. Unfortunately,
T.L.O. invites bootstrapping the use of evidence obtained by a stu-
dent search into decidedly noneducational settings.
195 Justice Stevens asserted in dissent that the majority did not contend that the state
has a compelling need to search in order to enforce minor school regulations. TL.O.,
469 U.S. at 377-78 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). However, neither did the
majority deny it.
196 Id. at 385-86 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Note, supra note
158, at 753.
197 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
198 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 n.3 ("[This case] implies no particular resolution of
the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule.").
199 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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B. A Suggested Approach for Analyzing Fourth Amendment
Searches
The T.L. 0. Court unnecessarily created a new school search ex-
ception to established fourth amendment analysis: preexisting law
provides the best solution to the problem. To preserve the integrity
of the amendment's language,20 0 the Court should retain conven-
tional warrant and probable cause requirements wherever possible.
After determining that the fourth amendment applies to the
search in question, a court should consider two further questions:
(1) whether the intrusion was the only practical method of achieving
an important law enforcement interest beyond gathering evidence
of criminal conduct, and (2) whether the proposed intrusion be-
longs in a specific class of search definable as limited in scope. If the
court answers either question in the negative, then it should con-
sider it a warrantless search and per se unreasonable. If both ques-
tions can be answered affirmatively, then the court may employ the
balancing test to determine whether it should ease the warrant
clause requirements in that situation. 20 1 This proposed test en-
dorses the Court's choices in cases prior to T.L.O. adopting a rea-
sonableness approach. 20 2
In the context of student searches, this framework more effec-
tively "ensure[s] that the interests of students will be invaded no
more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving
order in the schools" 20 3 than does the application of a reasonable-
ness standard to all school searches. This analysis permits a loosen-
ing of conventional fourth amendment protection based on not only
the nature of the school environment, but also the impracticability
200 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
201 This analysis acknowledges that it is unrealistic to treat all searches as equally
intrusive and that highly important governmental interests sometimes may outweigh an
individual's privacy interests when the intrusion is minimal in scope. If the court must
reach the balancing test, a highly important state interest, beyond the gathering of evi-
dence of criminal conduct, probably will outweigh the minimal intrusion involved. The
framework insures, though, that a balancing test cannot be used to validate a highly
intrusive search upon reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (discussed infra note 202).
202 See supra notes 167-69 & 183-87 and accompanying text. Less than six months
after its T.L.O. decision, the Supreme Court announced its decision in United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312-13 (1985), that the detention of a sus-
pected alimentary canal smuggler, based on reasonable suspicion, for almost 16 hours
before inspectors sought a search warrant was constitutional. The Court cited T.L.O. for
the proposition that "[w]hat is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself." Id. at 3308
(citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-43). Under the proposed framework, the Montoya de Her-
nandez search would require a warrant issued upon probable cause because of the highly
intrusive nature of the search. No state interest, no matter how compelling, should jus-
tify dismissal of the warrant clause requirements for such a highly intrusive search.
203 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
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of maintaining the warrant and probable cause requirements. Thus,
the same fourth amendment analysis will protect students' rights,
whether in school or out.
Applying this proposal to the facts of T.L. 0., a court would find
that the search violated T.L.O.'s fourth amendment rights. The bal-
ancing test would be inapplicable: although obtaining a warrant is
impracticable in a school setting, 20 4 subjecting searchers to the
probable cause requirement would not impede the maintenance of
school order.20 5 Furthermore, the search was not definable as lim-
ited in scope. There was a detailed, full-scale search of T.L.O.'s
purse. Arguably, Choplick's initial search 206 of T.L.O.'s purse was
not based on probable cause that she was violating the law or a
school rule-there was no law or rule prohibiting mere possession
of cigarettes. 20 7 Even if Choplick had probable cause for the initial




Although the Supreme Court's opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
laid to rest the theories formerly used by lower courts to justify in-
trusive searches of students in the school setting, the Court never-
theless failed to accord students conventional fourth amendment
204 See supra note 170.
205 See supra text accompanying note 170.
206 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
207 Possession of cigarettes is not probative of the accusation of smoking in the lava-
tory. Thus, Choplick lacked even reasonable suspicion to search. Even if Choplick had
reasonable suspicion to search, however, the full-scale scope of the search conducted
was unjustified. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
stated, "In the name of investigating a person who is no more than suspected of criminal
activity, the police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his ... other
effects." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). Choplick only suspected T.L.O. of
violating a school rule, yet he subjected her to a full-scale search.
208 The Court found there was a sufficient nexus between the accusation and posses-
sion of cigarettes to justify the search. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
209 The presence of rolling papers alone is not enough to constitute probable cause
to search for drugs. As Justice Brennan stated in dissent:
The mere presence without more of such a staple item of commerce is
insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in inferring both
that T.L.O. had violated the law by possessing marihuana and that evi-
dence of that violation would be found in her purse. Just as a police of-
ficer could not obtain a warrant to search a home based solely on his
claim that he had seen a package of cigarette papers in that home, Mr.
Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private possessions
of T.L.O. based on the mere presence of a package of cigarette papers.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan,J., concurring and dissenting); see supra note 24 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[A] search which is
reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolera-
ble intensity and scope." Terry, 392 U.S. at 18.
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protection. The Court carved out another exception to conven-
tional fourth amendment jurisprudence based on the supposed spe-
cial characteristics of the school environment. In so doing, the
Court implied that probable cause is not required for any search
that can later be deemed reasonable under the circumstances.
This Note proposes that the Court should employ a balancing
test only when it finds that it is impracticable to require a warrant or
probable cause, to achieve a law enforcement objective beyond
gathering evidence of criminal conduct and that the intrusion upon
the individual is limited in scope. The facts of TL.O. satisfied
neither of these requirements.
Even if a balancing test was appropriate in T.L.O., the Court
misapplied it. It is ill-advised to treat students differently from the
rest of society under the fourth amendment simply because they are
students. As JusticeJackson stated, "[Fourth amendment rights] are
not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispen-
sable freedoms. Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in
•.. crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart." 21
0
Dale Edward F. T. Zane
210 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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